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Multiple Margins of Fishing Behavior
• Fisheries management history: reactive policymaking 
- fishermen have far more flexibility than originally 
thought 
- new policies react to unanticipated consequences 
of previous policies
• Example: BC Salmon Limited Entry Program 1969
• Initial limits on number of vessels 
➡ Limit on tonnage of vessels 
➡ Limit on length of vessel 
➡ Limit on gear types 
➡ Limit on combining licenses
• Rapid erosion of effort controls as fishermen expanded 
into “free” effort dimensions.
• Traditional models of the fishing production process 
ignore the primary behavioral margins of fishermen 
!
- Early models: aggregate production functions relating 
industry catch to industry fishing effort 
!
- Powerful insights: e.g. open access = biological 
overexploitation + dissipation of rents (Gordon, 1954) 
!
- Interpretation: “too many boats chasing too few fish.” Fix 
incentives along this margin, and fisheries problem solved! 
!
- Accumulation of experience shows that other margins are 
likely to matter. 
!
Ignoring behavioral margins = regulatory 
surprises
• Multiple margins (extensive and intensive) across which 
fishermen act
“The New Fisheries Economics: 
Incentives Across Many Margins”
M.D. Smith (2012)
- amount of gear 
- type of gear 
- number of trips 
- trip length 
- target species 
!
- fishing grounds 
- product types 
- fish size 
- entry or exit 
- different fisheries
• To what extent should managers control these margins? 
-  How can managers control these margins? 
-  What are the consequences of ignoring them? 
-  How do we know ex ante what margins are important?
• Conventional aggregate fishery production models that 
ignore primary behavioral margins do not identify policy 
invariant parameters
Fishery Production Models and Policy 
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possibility curve could be drawn for each input level. Furthermore, we observe that 
the combination of outputs that maximise profit, given an input level, are equivalent 
to that which maximises revenue.^ The revenue equivalent to the isocost line is the 
isorevenue line, which has slope equal to {-pxlpi), the negative ratio of the output 
prices. The optimal (revenue-maximising) point is determined by the point of 
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Figure 3.1 Production Possibility Curve 
Production at any point on the production possibility curve other than point A in 
Figure 3.2 coincides with an isorevenue curve which is closer to the origin and, 
hence, implies a lower total revenue (and, thus, a lower profit). 
Before we return to our discussion of production sets and distance functions, we 
quickly make note of the fact that our discussion of biased technical change in the 
previous chapter can be extended to include multiple output situations. Technical 
change can favour the production of one commodity over another. This concept is 
illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
^ This is similar to the notion that selecting input levels so as to minimise the cost of producing a given 




• Catchability parameters and 
selectivity curves convey 
biological, technical, and 
behavioral relationships
Policy Invariant?
• It is naïve to try to predict the outcome of a policy 
intervention entirely on the basis of a relationship that 
systematically alters with a change in policy.
The Importance of Policy Invariance: Lucas 
Critique (1976)
• “Policy invariance facilitates the job of forecasting the 
impacts of interventions.  If some parameters are invariant 
to policy changes, they can be safely transported to 
different policy environments.” (Heckman, 2010)
What are the implications of ignoring key 
behavioral margins when predicting the 
effects of a policy? 
• Traditional approaches to modeling fishery production 
- How have these been used to predict policy interventions?
Outline
• Simulation exercise  
- How does a policy intervention change production 
relationships when accounting for behavioral margins?
• Empirical investigation of the Bering Sea groundfish fleet  
- Are empirical aggregate production relationships invariant 
to a policy change that changed fishermen incentives?
• Current and future directions 
- Implications for policy evaluation: where do we go from 
here?
A Pressing Question: Are Catch Shares 
Appropriate for Multispecies Fisheries?
• Catch shares—a secure privilege to harvest a proportion 
of a fishery’s total allowable catch.  
- can be allocated for multiple species 
- can be allocated to individuals, groups, or communities  
- often seen as “the way” to end the “race-for-fish” under 
open access institutions
A Pressing Question: Are Catch Shares 
Appropriate for Multispecies Fisheries?
• Can fishermen match their catch composition with a 
portfolio of quota allocations? 
- fishing gear is not perfectly selective (Squires et al. 1987) 
- could encourage illegal discarding and data fouling (Copes, 
1986) 
- “choke” species and unharvested quota 
- selectivity depends on targeting ability (Pascoe et al. 2007)  
• Targeting ability—or output substitution capabilities—can 
be represented via a multi-output production function 
- curvature of the production frontier indicates a fisherman’s 
“ability” to substitute between species   
well. Some researchers have modeled environmental output sets in which bad
outputs are effectively treated as inputs with similar strong disposability properties
which would yield an unbounded output set; for examples see Lee et al. (2002) or
Hailu and Veeman (2001). However, an unbounded output set is not physically
possible if traditional inputs are given.
Although our set representations of the technology are conceptually useful, they
are not very helpful from a computational viewpoint. Here we turn to function
representations of technology, which allow us to maintain our assumptions to
accommodate the production of byproducts, and are consistent with our axiomatic
approach. Our preferred model is the directional output distance function.4 Let
g ¼ ðgy; gbÞ be a directional vector (illustrated below), with g 2 R
MxRJ . The
directional distance function is defined as
~Doðx; y; b; gy;$gbÞ ¼ maxfb : ðyþ bgy; b$ bgbÞ 2 PðxÞg: ð4Þ
This function seeks the simultaneous maximum reduction in bad outputs and
expansion in good outputs. Fig. 2 illustrates the directional output distance function
for the direction vector g ¼ ðgy;$gbÞ. A firm F, with output coordinates ðb; yÞ
produces inside the output set PWðxÞ. If it were to operate efficiently given the
direction vector, g (represented by the ray 0g) it could expand y and contract b to the
boundary of PWðxÞ at point ðyþ b&gy; b$ b
&gbÞ, where b
& ¼ ~Doðx; y; b; gy;$gbÞ.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
b = undesirable output
y = desirable output
0
F = (b, y)
g = (gy, -gb)
(y + β*gy, b - β*gb)
PW(x)
(q/p)
Fig. 2. Directional output distance function with desirable and undesirable outputs.
4The directional output distance function is a variation of Luenberger’s shortage function, see
Luenberger (1992, 1995).
R. Färe et al. / Journal of Econometrics 126 (2005) 469–492474
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to model the opportunity cost associated with avoiding bycatch when bycatch and target
species are highly complimentary.2 I use this positive correlation between good and bad
outputs to justify the structure imposed on the functional form used to empirically estimate
conventional fishery production technology in the proceeding chapter.
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Figure 4.1: Production possibility set example - Example of a production set with bad
outputs. Adapted from Färe et al. (2005).
Satisfaction of conditions (i)-(vi) is s  cient to express the production process through
the use of a transformation function T (McFadden, 1978):
P (x) = {(y,b) : T (x,y,b)  0} , (4.8)
where T (x,y,b) = 0 represents the production possibilities frontier (PPF) that describes the
set of all combinations o “e cient” output that an be obtained from using the vector of in-
puts x.3 The production transformation function T (·) provides a convenient one-dimensional
relation that represents the multidimensional set of feasible output combinations, and al-
2This idea is made clearly for the general case of byproducts in Murty et al. (2012), who argue that the
null jointness and weak disposability assumptions are a reduced form way to capture positive correlation
between good and bad outputs through abatement e↵orts that are not explicitly modeled.
3The term e cient here means that for a input/output bundle on the frontier (x⇤,y⇤,b⇤) on the frontier
of the technology set, it is not possible to produce y   y⇤ using b  b⇤ and x  x⇤.
Output Set :
Output Substitutability with “Bad” Outputs
• Data from non-catch shares fisheries suggest catch 
shares face serious challenges due to weak substitution 
possibilities between species 
- e.g.  Squires (1987); Squires and Kirkley (1991,1995,1996); 
Pascoe et al. (2007,2010)  
• Evidence from multispecies catch shares shows greater 
flexibility than previously thought  
- e.g. Branch and Hilborn (2008); Sanchirico et al. (2006)   
• Perhaps output substitution revealed through ex ante 
empirical investigations reveal more about behavior and 
incentives than actual technical relationships. 
A Pressing Question: Are Catch Shares 
Appropriate for Multispecies Fisheries?










































Multispecies production function: micro-
foundations




































































Two Species : bycatch(1) and target(2)
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{E[y2tj ]  ⇢E[y1tj ]  rDt(j)}At each t :
⇢ = shadow cost of bycatch
and    are institutional parameters⇢ r
low    means fishermen do not internalize 
the external cost of bycatch.
⇢
starting location
Dt(j) = distance to j from current location
r = shadow cost of travel
high    means fishermen perceive an 
opportunity cost of not fishing.
r
starting location




{E[y2tj ]  ⇢E[y1tj ]  rDt(j)}At each t :
and    are institutional parameters⇢ r
Example
high     and low    represents a fishery 
with catch shares.
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Frontiers
Application: The Bering Sea Groundfish Fishery
Did rights-based management induce bycatch avoidance? 
Chapter 5. The Fishery Production Function: Implications for Fishery Policy Analysis 75
hyperbolic distance function has been applied in a fisheries setting to explicitly account
for the nature of bycatch or bad output production. Third, pre- and post-rationalization
data allow me to investigate the extent to which previous inferences on targeting ability in
non-rights-based fisheries reflect actual technological relationships or are merely the product
of the poor incentives for substitution provided without the security of harvesting rights.
These findings will be useful in guiding a priori assessment of the impacts of rights-based
management systems on the composition of multi-species catch and production.
5.1 The BSAI Groundfish Fishery
The BSAI non-pollock groundfish trawl fishery is a relatively small fleet of catcher processors
that ply the waters of the Eastern Bering Sea and the Aleutian Islands (Figure 5.1), using
bottom trawl gear to catch a variety of groundfish species.1 Vessels embark on trips of 2-4
weeks in length, processing harvested fish onboard. Processing is typically minimal, often
involving heading and gutting the fish, freezing them, and ultimately delivering them to
brokers or wholesalers for direct sale or further processing. Since the early 2000s, twenty-
three vessels have actively participated in the fishery, ranging in size from 91 to 295 feet
(median=154) with horsepower ranging from 850 to 7000 (median=2250).
²











Red King Crab Savings Area
(RKCSA)
Red King Crab Savings Subarea
 (RKCSS)
Figure 5.1: Map of Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands -
Generally speaking, the BSAI groundfish fishery can be divided into two fisheries: the
1“Groundfish” refers to any fish species that live on or near the bottom of the seafloor.
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands
The Bering Sea Groundfish Fishery
• Pre-Amendment 80 (prior to 2008): 
- Target species TACs allocated as common property over 
multiple “sub-seasons” 
- TAC for prohibited species allocated to target species 
fisheries  
- Target fisheries typically closed due to binding bycatch TAC 
- particularly true for halibut 
- Fishermen “unable” to avoid halibut
• Post-Amendment 80 (2008 and after): 
- Target species and bycatch allocations vested directly into 
cooperatives or limited access fishery 
- Initially one cooperative formed: 16 vessels, 7 companies   
Changes in Fishing Practices
January to April
• Large-scale shift 
in effort away from 
halibut-rich areas 
!
- Dark = increased 
effort 
- Light = decreased 
effort
• Fine-scale shift in 
effort after hauls 




- Probability of moving 
fishing locations 




Figure 8: Estimates of the change in probability of movements of a given minimum distance relative to 
2007 conditional on the percentage of halibut in the previous haul for cooperative members in the Bering 
Sea fishery. Estimates are derived from a linear probability model and error bars reflect 95% confidence 
intervals using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.  
 
 
Figure 9: Proportion of weekly fishing in nighttime hours by year for the cooperative portion of the fleet 
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controls” specifications include vessel, year, month and STAT6 (for the first haul in a sequence) fixed 
effects. Z-statistics (in parentheses) are based on cluster-robust standard errors clustered on combinations 
of vessel, year and week (* p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001).         
 
Table 3: Odds ratios and average marginal effects of annual dummy variables (base=2007) from a 
fractional logit regression of the proportion of daily fishing hours prosecuted at night in the Bering Sea by 
cooperative vessels. The regression includes fixed effects for week of fishing and vessel and utilizes the 
length of night on the given day as an offset variable. Z-statistics are based on cluster-robust standard 
errors that are clustered on combinations of vessel, year and week (* p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001).  
Odds Marg. Odds Marg. Odds Marg. Odds Marg.
Ratio Effect Ratio Effect Ratio Effect Ratio Effect
2002 1.019 0.004 1.083 0.018 1.016 0.003 1.146 0.032
(0.56) (0.56) (1.61) (1.61) (0.33) (0.33) (1.31) (1.33)
2003 1.059 0.011 1.133* 0.029* 0.985 -0.002 1.195 0.042
(1.69) (1.70) (2.45) (2.45) (-0.34) (-0.34) (1.62) (1.64)
2004 1.062 0.011 1.145** 0.031** 0.984 -0.003 1.104 0.024
(1.76) (1.76) (2.66) (2.67) (-0.38) (-0.38) (0.84) (0.84)
2005 1.069 0.013 1.112* 0.024* 1.016 0.003 0.870 -0.035
(1.93) (1.94) (2.17) (2.18) (0.35) (0.35) (-1.10) (-1.10)
2006 1.024 0.005 1.070 0.015 0.933 -0.011 1.096 0.022
(0.65) (0.65) (1.35) (1.35) (-1.40) (-1.40) (0.56) (0.56)
2008 0.775*** -0.049*** 0.690*** -0.081*** 0.742*** -0.043*** 1.083 0.019
(-6.69) (-6.65) (-5.89) (-5.95) (-5.62) (-5.43) (0.79) (0.79)
2009 0.799*** -0.044*** 0.742*** -0.067*** 0.782*** -0.067*** 1.066 0.015
(-5.44) (-5.43) (-4.58) (-4.61) (-4.17) (-4.61) (0.61) (0.62)
2010 0.758*** -0.055*** 0.796*** -0.051*** 0.710*** -0.05*** 0.884 -0.029
(-6.75) (-6.73) (-3.58) (-3.60) (-5.03) (-5.06) (-1.17) (-1.16)
N 18,260 7,461 8,010 2,789
Full Season January - April May - August September - December
• Shift away from night-fishing 
- Halibut more abundant during night-time hours
Changes in Fishing Practices
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Figure 5.14: Daily halibut per rock sole - Box-and-whisker plots and kernel-smoothed
densities of daily halibut per rock sole.
all inputs and other outputs constant. As an approximation of this, Figure 5.15 presents
a scatter plot of daily rock sole and halibut catch and the best fitting quadratic function
within a small range of daily fishing duration.25 To account for the di↵erent sampling scheme
before and after A80, I divide daily production and fishing hours by the number of trawls
in a day. The figure clearly displays the very di↵erent subsets of the production set that are
sampled before and after A80, reminiscent of the simulated production sets in Chapter 4.
The fitted quadratic functions suggest that post-A80 production frontiers lie well above those
pre-A80, indicating that considerably more rock sole is caught for a given level of halibut are
A80. While this supports those findings in Figure 5.14, it also indicates that the absolute
production of rock sole increased substantially, despite the lower amounts of halibut caught.
25I omit the range of daily fishing duration to protect the confidentiality of fishermen. The best quadratic
fit was estimated without a constant to be consistent with the idea of null-jointness presented in Chapter 4.
Estimation with a constant produced similar patterns.
January-April
Changes in Bycatch Intensity













0 .5 1 1.5 2
Halibut (mt)













0 .5 1 1.5 2
Halibut (mt)
Pre-A80 Post-A80
Figure 5.15: Production set in rock sole–halibut space - Sample daily production set
in rock sole–halibut space for a small window of daily trawling hours. Production is divided
by the number of trawls in a day.
5.5 The output distance function
While Figure 5.15 provides some evidence of a shift in the reduced form production fron-
tier, the fitted quadratic functions do not qualify as a bonafide production frontier since the
production of other outputs is not being held constant, nor do they account for other pos-
sible mechanisms such as ine ciency or heterogeneity in fishermen. Thus, a more rigorous
investigation of the transformation function defining the frontier of the PPF is needed. As
previously discussed, a transformation function approach to describing technology su↵ers
from the fact that the transformation function cannot be identified empirically without im-
posing some form of normalization. For this reason, ? and ? found it convenient to work
with a normalized form of the transformation function called the output distance function.
The output distance function represents the distance an output bundle is away from
January-April
Changes in Bycatch Intensity
Estimating Fishing Production Function
• A Hyperbolic Distance Function Approach 
Transformation Function:
T (x, y, b) = 0
Hyperbolic Output 
Distance Function:
y = b =inputs good outputs bad outputs
D
H(x, y, b) = min
✓
{✓ > 0 : T (x, y/✓, b✓)  0}
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Estimating Fishing Production Function
• A Hyperbolic Distance Function Approach 
Relative Substitutability

















Figure 5.18: Relative substitutability (sub) - MLE estimated mean sub between halibut
(b) and rock sole (y) as derived in equation (5.13) for the annual (left) and B&A (right) model.
Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals computed using the delta method.
5.8.3 Morishima elasticity of substitution (MES)
As discussed in Section 5.6.4, MES provides a measure of the curvature of the PPF, quan-
tifying the rate at which MRTby increases as the good to bad ratio (y/b) increases. MES
will take on a negative value if the outputs are substitutes and a positive value if the outputs
are complements. We would thus expect MESby to be positive between rock sole and hal-
ibut. The size of the value is a measure of the strength of the substitute/complementarity
relationship. In particular, values of MESby that are greater in magnitude imply that a
marginal reduction in halibut bycatch will come at a relatively higher opportunity cost.
I estimate MESby for both the annual and B&A models, evaluated at the seasonal mean
(Figure 5.19).48 As expected, MESby is positive—indicating that rock sole and halibut are
48See equation (B.7) in Appendix B.1 for the actual statistic for MESby.
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Figure D.1: Estimated production possibilities frontiers. - MLE estimated PPFs in
rock sole - halibut space for the annual and post normal-exponential model.
Lessons
• Pre-A80 production frontier considerably different from 
post-A80 frontier: 
- Estimated production relationship is a function of 
technology, biology, and behavioral incentives 
- Highlights the difficulty in assessing the potential for cross-
species substitution in fisheries using ex ante data alone 
• Fishermen substantially altered catch compositions in a 
complex multispecies fishery: 
- Multiple margins of behavior: e.g. macro-location choices, 
micro-spatial responses, reduced night-time fishing  
- Substitution potential was latent until management changes 
altered incentives
Moving Forward….
• Greater structure needed for models of behavior: 
- Nest fishing decisions in a structural economic (i.e. 
optimization) model to identify “deep” parameters that are 
invariant to policy intervention 
- More demanding in terms of time, data, and assumptions 
!
• Ex ante predictions require greater care be given to 
modeling fishing as a process: 
- Information derived from micro-data 
- Production models are context-specific  
- Conversations with fishermen to understand fundamental 
decisions 
- May not map perfectly into notion of “conventional inputs”
Examples
• Predicting the behavioral response to a spatial closure 
(Smith and Wilen, 2003): 
- Estimate spatial behavior as a function of location-specific 
characteristics using ex ante data 
- Identify behavioral parameters that can be transported to a 
setting with only a subset of locations to choose from 
- Key: incentives stayed the same with only a change in  
constraints
• Predicting the behavioral response to ITQs (Reimer et 
al., 2014) 
- Predict response to ITQs in Alaska red king crab fishery 
using ex ante data  





• Accurate assessment of the impacts of a policy requires 
a description of the production process that is sufficiently 
“deep” so as to be invariant to changes in management 
institutions 
“Without detailed and accurate prediction of 
firms’ response to policies, regulations can have 
unexpected and adverse results.” (Bockstael and 
Opaluch, 1983)
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Figure 5.4: Biomass estimates - (left) Stock assessment estimates of biomass. Estimates
for cod, yellowfin sole, and rock sole biomass (left axis) are obtained from NPFMC (2011).
Estimates for halibut biomass (right axis) is obtained from Hare (2011). (right) Percentage
di↵erence in biomass estimates from 2007.
5.3 The rock sole/cod fishery
For reasons discussed above, I limit my analysis to the early season rock sole/cod fishery
(henceforth RS fishery) in the Eastern Bering Sea for the years 2005 to 2010. The RS fishery
is relatively well-defined prior to A80 implementation by the opening season date (January 20
every year), the fishery closing date (Table 5.1), and the fact that the other major subfishery
at this time of year takes place in a distinctly di↵erent geographical region (i.e. the Atka
mackerel fishery in the Aleutian Islands). For the years 2005 to 2007, the RS fishery was
closed prematurely due to a binding halibut TAC, leaving a large portion of the rock sole and
cod TACs unharvested. The end of the RS fishery is not particularly well-defined post-A80
however, since there is no o cial closing of the fishery. To remedy this, I choose a post-A80
• Earliest models:  y = qEX
Combined with a surplus production model, this simple harvest function led to 
some important insights: 
 - Open access and rent dissipation (Gordon, 1954; Smith, 1969) 
 - Sole ownership (Scott, 1955) 
 - Regulated open access (Homans and Wilen, 1997) 
 - General lesson: solve the open access problem by limiting entry 
!
 
Production Models in Fisheries
• Expanding the index effort:
1.1. The fishing production process 9
1.1.2 Expanding the aggregate input e↵ort
Misconception of the rent dissipation process stemmed from the misinterpretation
that boats were the only margin of fishing e↵ort. With the continuation of rent
dissipation along unregulated e↵ort dimensions in limited entry fisheries, it became
clear that the simple representation of fishery production in equation (1.1) was not
su ciently rich enough to capture the primary decisions that fishermen make. This
left policy makers with little information on which to base predictions regarding
the outcome of a policy change (Wilen, 1988).
Economists responded by extending models of fishery production to include
more realistic aspects of fishing technology. Early extensions viewed e↵ort as part
of a multistage optimization process, whereby quasi-fixed factors of production
xf—such as vessel length, tonnage, engine size, gear type, and crew size—and
variable factors of production xv—such as aggregate measures of fishing time and
fuel consumption—are optimally and e ciently combined to form an aggregate
input index (e↵ort) in the first stage,
E = E(xf ,xv)
and subsequently used as an input in the fishery production in the second stage
(Rothschild, 1972; Anderson, 1976; Cunningham and Whitmarsh, 1980),
y = f(E(xf ,xv);X).
Within this framework, models of the rent dissipating process under command
and control regulations began to emerge.3 Anderson (1985) demonstrated that in
an environment where e↵ort is supplied at increasing unit cost, restricting gear
choice raises the unit cost of all e↵ort employed and reduces the number of re-
dundant units actually used, thereby generating positive net rents in a restricted
3Squires (1987a) pointed out that separate components of e↵ort can only be consistently ag-
gregated into a composite index under homothetic separability. That is, the aggregate index
E(x) can be formed only if it is possible to meaningfully rank alternative levels of e↵ort without
knowing the levels of species harvested. Squires went on to provide a means by which to em-
pirically test the structure of production for the existence of fishing e↵ort and demonstrated the
theoretically proper manner by which to construct a consistent e↵ort index.
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choice raises the unit cost of all e↵ort employed and reduces the number of re-
dundant units actually used, thereby generating positive net rents in a restricted
3Squires (1987a) pointed out that separate components of e↵ort can only be consistently ag-
gregated into a composite index under homothetic separability. That is, the aggregate index
E(x) can be formed only if it is possible to meaningfully rank alternative levels of e↵ort without
knowing the levels of species harvested. Squires went on to provide a means by which to em-
pirically test the structure of production for the exist nce of fishing e↵ort and demonstrated the
theoretically proper manner by which to construct a consistent e↵ort index.
- Rent dissipation along unregulated effort dimensions under limited entry 
highlighted the i adequacy of si gle index effort models to epict fishi g 
behavior. 
- Multi-input effort models emerged, demonstrating that rent dissipation under 
input control regulations depended on substitutability between regulated and 
unregulated inputs (Anders n, 1985; Squires, 1987; Campbell and Lindner, 
1990; Dupont, 1991)
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EFFECT OF A 50 PERCENT BUY-BACK UNDER DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS 
ABOUT ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION 
cific value of E0. Since equations [12], [13], 
and [14] also contain the parameters A, K, 
r, and y, the exogenously determined vari- 
ables p, v, and w, and the endogenously 
determined variable Ro, it is clear that there 
is a very large number of combinations f 
values of these variables which will make a 
given (p, 8) pair consistent with the chosen 
initial equilibrium, E0. We have run the 
simulations for a range of these combina- 
tions and have found that our results, ex- 
pressed in percentage terms, are invariant 
to the chosen values of parameters and 
variables other than p, 8, and E0. 
When we run our simulations for various 
values of p and 8 we express the percent- 
age efficiency of the limitation program as: 
(HiB/F) x 100 where HB is the flow of rent under the limitation program and HF is the 
theoretical maximum flow of rent under 
sole ownership. The flow of rent under the 
limitation scheme can be calculated as: 
HB = [ARE - ColE - iB, [18] 
which can be computed using equations 
[12], [13], [15], and [17] together with the 
equilibrium condition, ARE = MCE. The 
theoretical maximum flow f rent is defined 
as: 
II = [ARE- C0]E*, [19] 
where E* is the first-best optimum level of 
effort. The value of E* is obtained by solv- 
ing a[(ARE - Co)E}/aE = 0 for E* and it remains constant in our initial set of simula- 
tions. Since the Schaefer model is used to 
derive the ARE schedule, the ARE schedule 
is linear and, in consequence, E* = 0.5Eo. 
IV. RESULTS 
Our first set of results is for a 50 percent 
limitation program applied to a fishery with 
Production Models in Fisheries
Production Models in Fisheries
• Expanding the index catch:
- Single output production models ignored the multi-species component of 
fisheries, imposing input-output separability and/or nonjointness in inputs 
- Multi-output models emerged characterizing output substitutability: 
- Dual formulations (Squires, 1987; Kirkley and Strand 1988) 
- Primal Formulations (Felthoven and Morrison Paul, 2004)
1.1. The fishing production process 11
idence that emerged from these investigations is that fishermen are quite capable
of substituting between restricted and unrestricted inputs, leaving fishery rents at
risk of being dissipated in command and control fisheries with input controls.
1.1.3 Expanding the single input catch
The expansion of e↵ort along unregulated margins, however, is not the only element
of production that can bring about economic and biological waste in fisheries. Input
controls are typically combined with output controls, such as TACs. Furthermore,
many fisheries are characterized by the joint production of multiple species, which
requires regulators to set a TAC for each species. Constructing a portfolio of
individual TACs, however, requires an understanding of the nature of biological
and economic interactions. Failure to balance individual TACs with the actual
catch composition of the fleet can result in rampant illegal discarding, data fouling,
and over-harvesting of the “binding” species (Copes, 1986).
The multi-species nature of the fishing production process and the possibilities
for output substitution were largely ignored in early models of fishing production.
The single output production representation in equation (1.1) is not able to cap-
ture the multi-species nature of many fisheries. The standard representation of
technology with multiple outputs y uses a production set,
P (x) = {y : T (x,y)  0} , (1.3)
where the set P represents the set of outputs y that can be jointly produced from
the input vector x and T (x,y) = 0 represents the production possibilities frontier
(PPF) that describes the set of all combinations of “e cient” output that can be
obtained from using the vector of inputs x (Figure 1.2).4
Early models of fishing productivity either focused on a single species or com-
bined multiple species into an aggregate index (output), e↵ectively imposing input-
output separability on the fishing production technology.5 Furthermore, manage-
4The term e cient here means that for a output bundle on the frontier of the production set
y⇤, it is not possible to produce y   y⇤ while holding x constant.
5Input-output separability permits the transformation function in equation (1.3) to be written
as G(y) = f(x), where G(y) aggregates the outputs y into a single composite measure.
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possibility curve could be drawn for each input level. Furthermore, we observe that 
the combination of outputs that maximise profit, given an input level, are equivalent 
to that which maximises revenue.^ The revenue equivalent to the isocost line is the 
isoreve ue line, which has slope equ l to {-pxlpi), the negative ra io of the out ut 
pric s. The optimal (revenue-maximising) point is determined by the point of 
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Figure 3.1 Production Possibility Curve 
Production at any point on the production possibility curve other than point A in 
Figure 3.2 coincides with an isorevenue curve which is closer to the origin and, 
hence, implies a lower total revenue (and, thus, a lower profit). 
Before we return to our discussion of production sets and distance functions, we 
quickly make note of the fact that our discussion of biased technical change in the 
previous chapter can be extended to include multiple output situations. Technical 
change can favour the production of one commodity over another. This concept is 
illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
^ This is similar to the notion that selecting input levels so as to minimise the cost of producing a given 
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Figure 5.2: Weekly production and closures - Weekly production and fishery closures
for the BSAI groundfish fisheries in 2006. Data is from the weekly production reports.8
mented to the BSAI Fishery Management Plan. The provisions of A80 were designed to
facilitate increased target catch and profits, reduced bycatch and discards, and increased
flexibility while complying with target and prohibited species TACs. Implementation of A80
made a number of changes to the state of fishery regulations at the time. First, A80 e↵ec-
tively limited future entry into the fishery and granted a defined share of the total A80 TAC
for the six target species (yellowfin sole, rock sole, flathead sole, Pacific cod, Atka mackerel,
and Pacific Ocean perch) to each vessel according to their catch history. Second, vessels could
vest their shares in either a cooperative formed by participating members or in a limited
access common pool fishery. Cooperatives are given considerable flexibility as to how catch
entitlements are internally allocated. Leasing arrangements and/or non-arms-length meth-
ods of internal reallocation are all feasible, and some trading between cooperatives is allowed
as well. Vessels that join the limited access fishery vest their shares to a common pool that
• Large-scale shift 
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